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Abstract
This Interim Report first appeared as a chapter in Climate Change -
Socioeconomic Dimensions and Consequences of Mitigation Measures (Pekka Pirilä,
Editor; publisher Oy EDITA AB, Helsinki, 2000). It is reprinted here, with permission,
with minor revisions. Preceding chapters in the book discuss possible adverse
consequences of climate change. This chapter starts by assuming that the possibility of
such adverse consequences justifies action to limit climate change. Its purpose is then
twofold. First, it summarizes the state of the art in modeling long-term greenhouse gas
emissions from energy use, and extracts lessons for international (and national) efforts
to limit emissions. Two such lessons are emphasized -- the importance of technological
progress to reduce the world’s energy intensity, and the importance of shifting from
fossil to non-fossil fuels as our primary energy sources. Given these basic objectives,
this chapter next addresses “burden sharing” -- the question of how the burden of
limiting emissions ought to be shared among countries, particularly between rich and
poor. The chapter does not advocate any particular burden sharing formula; indeed it
argues that debates over formulas may generate more heat than light. Instead the chapter
emphasizes efforts to implement and expand emission trading, particularly with
developing countries, which are expected to have large opportunities for low-cost
emission reductions. Not only will effective trading lead to efficient reductions, it could
well represent large revenues for developing countries -- revenues that the rich
developed countries could well be more than happy to pay.
1Climate Change and World Energy
Alan McDonald
1 Introduction
This chapter assumes that the potential dangers outlined in previous chapters make a
persuasive case for limiting possible global warming. The chapter starts by reviewing
scenarios of long-term global energy use, the prime source of anthropogenic greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, to see what they suggest as essential pieces of a successful mitigation
strategy. Two important generalizations emerge. These are the importance of technological
progress to reduce the world’s energy intensity if GHG concentrations are to be stabilized,
and the importance of shifting from fossil to non-fossil fuels as our primary energy sources.
The chapter then examines current issues and proposals within the framework of the Kyoto
Protocol and the UNFCCC1 negotiation process in light of these two necessary conditions for
GHG stabilization. The chapter’s final section attempts to outline a plausible generic strategy
at a national level that incorporates the principal lessons of the global perspective within the
constraints of the existing political debate.
The analysis of scenarios describing possible long-term emissions of greenhouse
gases and their possible impacts has become a big business. Morita and Lee (1998) have
assembled a selective database that still contains over 400 such scenarios. These 400-plus
scenarios show tremendous variation in their particulars. Some of this reflects the tastes and
preferences of the scenario builders and the different capabilities of the models they use. But
most of it reflects the very real uncertainty in nearly every facet of global warming that
researchers can conceive of studying -- population growth, economic growth, political
changes, technological developments, energy resources, land needs, human diets, ecosystem
responses, atmospheric chemistry, and so on. As one illustration, Figure 1 shows the
impressive range of projected carbon dioxide emissions in Morita and Lee’s database.
Given such variation among scenarios, they cannot, as a group, define a single
detailed route by which the world can avoid the problems foreseen in earlier chapters.
Fortunately, however, there are a few generalizations -- two to be precise -- that emerge from
the 400-plus scenarios about how to avoid such problems. These are the importance of
technological progress to reduce the world’s energy intensity (i.e., the amount of energy used
to produce a euro’s worth of gross world product), and the equal importance of shifting from
fossil to non-fossil fuels as our primary energy sources. These generalizations can be used to
guide national and international policy making, even before all the analytic loose ends are
tied up.
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 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN, 1992).
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Figure 1: The range of global CO2 emissions, 1900 to 2100, for the scenarios in
Morita and Lee’s database. Emissions are indexed to a value of one in 1990, when actual
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This chapter’s discussion of how these two lessons are reflected in the scenario
literature will address only one well defined subset of Morita and Lee’s scenario database,
specifically a set of six scenarios developed jointly by the International Institute for Applied
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1998a). These six cover the lower 70% of the distribution in Figure 1, i.e., the 70% of the
database scenarios with the lowest carbon emissions. They have the added advantage of
already being extensively documented, having undergone detailed international reviews by
ten expert regional groups assembled by WEC.
2 Six IIASA-WEC Scenarios
The six IIASA-WEC scenarios are divided into three cases. Case A presents a future
of impressive technological improvements and consequent high economic growth. Case B
describes a future with less ambitious, though perhaps more realistic, technological
improvements, and consequently more intermediate economic growth. Case C presents a
“rich and green” future. It includes both substantial technological progress and unprecedented
international cooperation, including major resource transfers from North to South, centered
explicitly on environmental protection and international equity. These are driven by explicit
policies, including carbon taxes, to reduce global carbon emissions in 2100 to two gigatons of
carbon (GtC), one-third the level of global emissions in 1990. Key characteristics of the three
cases are given in Table 1.
3Table 1: Summary of the three IIASA-WEC cases in 2050 and 2100 compared with
1990 (GWP = gross world product, Gtoe = gigatons oil equivalent, and GtC = gigatons of
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Case
A B C
High growth Middle course Ecologically driven
Population, billion
  1990 5.3 5.3 5.3
  2050 10.1 10.1 10.1
  2100 11.7 11.7 11.7
GWP, trillion US(1990)$
  1990 20 20 20
  2050 100 75 75
  2100 300 200 220
Global primary energy intensity
  improvement, percent per year Medium Low High
  1990 to 2050 -0.9 -0.8 -1.4
  1990 to 2100 -1.0 -0.8 -1.4
Primary energy demand, Gtoe
  1990 9 9 9
  2050 25 20 14
  2100 45 35 21
Resource availability
  Fossil High Medium Low
  Non-fossil High Medium High
Technology costs
  Fossil Low Medium High
  Non-fossil Low Medium Low
Technology dynamics
  Fossil High Medium Medium
  Non-fossil High Medium High
Environmental taxes No No Yes
CO2 emission constraint No No Yes
Net carbon emissions, GtC
  1990 6 6 6
  2050 9-15 10 5
  2100 6-20 11 2
Number of scenarios 3 1 2
The principal driving forces determining how energy use and supply evolve are
population, economic growth, and technology. The top of Table 1 shows that all three IIASA-
WEC cases use the World Bank’s 1992 population projection (Bos et al., 1992). According to
this projection, population doubles between 1990 and 2060 to 10.5 billion people, reaches
411.7 billion in 2100, and eventually stabilizes around 12 billion. Nearly all the population
growth occurs in developing countries. The IIASA-WEC study chose not to vary population
among the scenarios, arguing it would have led to distracting demographic debates while
adding little to the conclusions the study could draw about energy.
Turning to economic growth, in all cases the world gets richer, with the poor getting
richer faster that the rich. As shown in Table 1 the gross world product (GWP) in Case A is
15 times higher in 2100 than in 1990. In Case B it is 10 times higher, and in Case C it is 11
times higher, better than in Case B. Case C’s greater income in developing regions relative to
Case B -- driven by substantial North-to-South resource transfers -- more than offsets Case
C’s lower income growth in developed, donor regions (due to those same North-to-South
transfers). The regional patterns of per capita income growth incorporated in the three
different cases are based on extensive historical data relating per capita income growth and
economic structure to stages of economic development. The range across the three cases and
across regions reflects the range of historical experience.
The third driving force is technology. The basic differences in technology across the
three cases are reflected in three of the items in Table 1: resource availability (which depends
on technological progress in exploration and extraction), technology costs, and technology
dynamics. Technology dynamics refer to the speed with which technological costs come
down as we learn and gain experience over time. The technology parameters were also varied
within Case A to produce three scenarios, and within Case C to produce two scenarios, as
follows.
In Scenario A1, investments and technological progress focus on oil and gas, and the
future availability of oil and gas resources is relatively high. As a result the dominance of oil
and gas is perpetuated to the end of the 21st century. At the other end of the spectrum,
Scenario A2 assumes oil and gas resources to be scarce and investments and technological
progress to favor coal. The result is a massive return to coal. Finally, in Scenario A3 rapid
technological change in nuclear and renewable energy technologies results in a phaseout of
fossil fuels for economic reasons rather than due to resource scarcity. Table 2 compares the
range of fossil fuel consumption in the scenarios against current estimates of fossil fuel
resources.
Table 2: Fossil energy resources and consumption, in gigatons oil equivalent (Gtoe),
showing the range in cumulative projected consumption between 1990 and 2050 across the
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Cumulative Extraction Conventional Resource Additional
1850-1990 1990-2050 Reserves Base Occurrences
Oil 90 180-297 150 820 1,900
Gas 41 171-253 140 870 19,100*
Coal 125 123-273 600 3,400 3,000
Total 256 474-823 890 5,090 24,000
*including methane hydrates
In Case C, which is the most optimistic about technology and geopolitics, nuclear
energy is at a crossroads, and two scenarios are included. In Scenario C1 nuclear power
proves a transient technology that is eventually phased out entirely by the end of the 21st
5century. In Scenario C2 a new generation of nuclear reactors is developed that is inherently
safe and small scale -- 100 to 300 megawatts electric (MWe) installed capacity -- and finds
widespread social acceptability.
2.1 Energy Use
Primary energy use grows substantially in the scenarios (Figure 2), but, because of
energy intensity improvements, it grows less than GWP. In Case A primary energy use in
2100 is five times what it was in 1990. In Case B it is four times, and in Case C 2.3 times, the
1990 value. However, the global results of Figure 2 hide some important regional differences.
While the growth in primary energy use is substantial in developing countries across all
scenarios and steady in countries in economic transition, primary energy use in the OECD
essentially stabilizes around 2040 in Case B and, in Case C, starts to decline immediately and
continues to decrease throughout the 21st century. In part, this is due to low population
growth in the OECD. In part it is due to rapid technological progress and efficiency gains,
and in part it is due to Case C’s relative shift in economic growth to the South, reflecting the
objective of international equity and the mechanism of large North-to-South resource
transfers. Thus the expectations of environmentalists who imagine more income in the OECD
with less energy use are quite consistent with Case C.
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Figure 2: Global primary energy use, historical development from 1850 to 1990 and
in the three cases to 2100, in gigatons oil equivalent (Gtoe). The insert shows global
population growth, 1850 to 1990 and projections to 2100, in billions of people (source: Bos et
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et al., 1998a.
As shown in Figure 3 the pattern of final energy use is remarkably consistent across
scenarios, with relatively small variations among Cases A, B, and C. Variations among the
three Case A scenarios, and the two Case C scenarios, are even smaller. All three cases
reflect a continuing pervasive shift toward energy reaching consumers in increasingly
flexible, convenient, and clean forms. Ever less energy is used in its original form, such as
traditional direct uses of coal and biomass, and ever more energy reaches consumers through
elaborate systems of energy conversion and delivery. Simply put, you cannot directly operate
6a personal computer with coal. The overall shift to higher-quality energy carriers and
dedicated transport systems, such as pipelines and networks, enhances trade possibilities and
promotes similar end-use patterns across regions with fundamentally different primary energy
supply structures.
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Figure 3: World final energy by form, in percent, as solids, liquids, and grids.
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Turning next to the structure of primary energy supply, the significant result is that
there is a wide range of supply structures that can successfully match the persistent final
energy trends of Figure 3. The range of primary energy supply structures is shown in Figure
4. Each corner of the triangle corresponds to a hypothetical situation in which all primary
energy is supplied by a single category of fuels: oil and gas at the top, coal at the left, and
non-fossil sources (renewables and nuclear) at the right. In 1990 their respective shares were
53% for oil and gas (measured against the horizontal grid lines and the scale on the right),
24% for coal (measured against the scale on the left), and 23% for non-fossil energy sources
(measured against the bottom scale).
Because of the long lifetimes of power plants, refineries, and other energy
investments, there is not enough capital stock turnover in the scenarios prior to 2020 to allow
them to diverge significantly. But the seeds of the post-2020 divergence in the structure of
energy systems will have been widely sown by then based on research, development, and
demonstration (RD&D) efforts, intervening investments, and technology diffusion strategies.
It is these decisions between now and 2020 that will largely determine which of the diverging
post-2020 development paths will materialize.
After 2020 all scenarios move away from their current reliance on conventional oil
and gas. This transition progresses relatively slowly in Scenario A1 where oil and gas are
plentiful. In Scenario A3 and Case C, it progresses more rapidly due to faster technological
progress (Scenario A3) or because of energy and environmental policies favoring non-fossil
fuels (Case C). In Scenario A2 and Case B, the transition away from oil and gas includes an
important contribution from coal, whose long-term market share after 2050 ranges between
20% and 40%. Nonetheless, little of this coal is used directly. It is instead converted to the
7high-quality energy carriers (electricity, liquids, and gases) demanded by the high-income
consumers of the second half of the 21st century.
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Figure 4: Evolution of primary energy structure, shares of oil and gas, coal, and non-
fossil sources, in percent, historical development from 1850 to 1990 (triangles) and in
scenarios to 2020 (open circles), 2050 (diamonds), and 2100 (closed circles). For an
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2.2 Carbon Emissions
Figure 5 divides carbon emissions in the scenarios between the Annex I regions and
the non-Annex I regions. The limits in the Kyoto Protocol apply only to Annex I countries
and are shown in the aggregate in the figure. Only Case C is unambiguously in compliance,
although Case B and Scenario A3 come close. Scenarios A1 and A2 offer scant hope of
compliance.
What brings Case B and Scenario A3 close to compliance is the fact that emissions
decrease initially in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (FSU)2 and
Eastern Europe as a result of economic recessions in the early 1990s.  As shown in the insert
in Figure 5, FSU emissions in 2010 are below their Kyoto limits by about 120 megatons of
carbon (MtC) in Scenario A3 and 280 MtC in Case B, a difference sometimes referred to as
the “Russian bubble” or “hot air.” By itself the Russian bubble does not lead to compliance
with the Kyoto Protocol. But with international emission trading the bubble can go a long
way in that direction. Case B and Scenario A3 might therefore also comply with the Kyoto
limits. Based on estimates of the potential trading price of emission reduction units that cover
almost an order of magnitude, from US$20 per ton of carbon (tC) up through US$150 per tC,
the total potential value of the Russian bubble is huge, from US$80 billion in Scenario A3 to
US$170 billion in Case B (Victor et al., 1998). Such sums, which would constitute the largest
policy-motivated transfer of cash since the Marshall Plan, raise doubts about the practicality
                                                
2
 Figure 6 shows the regional definitions used in the IIASA-WEC study.
8of implementing emission trading. (The mechanics, economics, politics, and possible future
of emission trading are discussed in more detail later in the chapter.)
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Figure 5: Net energy-related carbon emissions, in GtC, historical development from
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emission limit of the Kyoto Protocol. The insert shows emissions in FSU compared with
1990. The Russian Federation and Ukraine’s 1990 emissions equal their Kyoto limits.
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Figure 5, however, stops at 2010, which is a very short time horizon for global
warming issues. The longer-term picture is shown in Figure 7. For Case B, although emission
trading might make it possible to just squeeze under the bar during the Kyoto budget period
of 2008-2012, emission levels subsequently take off and never look back. Thus Case B is
hardly a long-term answer to potential climate warming. And for the issue of climate
warming, it is only the long term that matters. Only Case C and Scenario A3 lead to
stabilization of the atmospheric CO2 concentration, consistent with the ultimate objective of
the UNFCCC. Case C leads to stabilization below 450 parts per million by volume (ppmv).
Scenario A3 leads to stabilization below 550 ppmv assuming that its emissions, which peak
around 2060, continue to decline after 2100.
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scenarios to 2100, in GtC. For each scenario, the range shows the difference between gross
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2.3 Conclusions
The four major conclusions of the IIASA-WEC study that are most important for
climate change policy are the following.
World energy needs will increase: World population is expected to nearly double over
the next century, and economic development must continue, particularly in the South. Most
of the population doubling will occur in developing countries where even today two billion
people have no access to commercial energy. Providing them with access to convenient and
clean energy, providing energy to the almost six billion more people expected by 2100, and
even partially meeting the growth aspirations of the developing world will quite simply
require a lot more energy. According to the scenarios, primary energy requirements are 1.5 to
3 times higher in 2050 than in 1990, and 2 to 5 times higher in 2100. Thanks to projected
energy intensity improvements, these energy consumption increases lead to even greater
increases in economic output -- a 3- to 5-fold increase by 2050 and a 10- to 15-fold increase
by 2100. In all six IIASA-WEC scenarios the gap between rich and poor decreases. However
even in the high-growth Case A, per capita income in 2100 in sub-Saharan Africa (AFR),
after a century of economic and energy growth, is still only half its 1990 level in the Pacific
OECD countries (PAO). The necessity of providing more energy than today and at the same
time fewer emissions emphasizes the importance of technological progress and non-fossil
fuels.
Resource availability will not be a major global constraint: But while the market for
energy will be large and growing, there will be lots of competition from a wide range of
potential suppliers. The increased energy demand will not necessarily force the world into the
arms of low- or non-carbon renewables and nuclear power. The resource scarcity perceived in
the 1970s did not occur as originally assumed, and with technological and economic
development, estimates of the ultimately available energy resource base -- including oil, gas,
and coal -- will continue to increase. A variety of assumptions about the timing and extent of
new discoveries of fossil energy reserves and resources (conventional and unconventional),
and about improvements in the economics of their recoverability, are reflected in the
scenarios. All, however, indicate that economic development over the next century will not
be constrained by geological resources. Nor will geology force the displacement of high-
carbon fuels by low- or non-carbon fuels over the next century. Whether we make such a
transition will depend on our investment choices. We could choose to invest -- as some
people already are -- in coal-based liquid fuels for transportation and in “clean coal”
technologies that greatly reduce sulfur emissions and local and regional air pollution. Then
the future might look like Scenario A2, with high economic growth and high carbon
emissions. Or we could choose to invest in non-fossil technologies -- again as some people
are -- and the future might look more like Case C or Scenario A3. It is up to us. Neither
geology nor resource economics mandates a particular choice.
There is a continuing pervasive shift toward energy reaching consumers in
increasingly flexible, convenient, and clean forms, and this shift in final energy patterns can
be met by a wide range of energy supplies: In all scenarios historical trends continue toward
electricity and higher-quality fuels, such as natural gas, oil products, methanol, and hydrogen.
Solid fuels such as traditional biomass and coal in residential and commercial applications
are gradually phased out in all scenarios. Grid-dependent fuels such as electricity, natural gas,
and eventually also hydrogen are phased in. But again, the continued shift toward cleaner,
more flexible, and more convenient energy forms at the level of end use does not mandate a
shift to low- or non-carbon energy sources. In Scenario A2, for example, coal based synthetic
11
fuels and electricity make the shift possible even in a high-coal future with high carbon
emissions. If we are to have a low-carbon future, we must actively pursue it.
Technological change will be critical, and early investments will make the difference:
The difference between the three Case A scenarios is in the rates of technological progress
for different energy sources and technologies -- oil, gas, coal, nuclear, and renewables.
Technological progress is hardly predictable, and history is full of both surprising failures and
surprising successes. Nonetheless, the more RD&D devoted to a particular technology, the
better the odds of lowering its costs and improving its performance. And the quicker we gain
experience with a particular technology -- i.e., the quicker it spreads into niche markets and
then broader applications -- the faster costs decrease and performance increases. This means
that early entrants into the energy market have a significant increasing advantage, other
things being equal. As experience with early technological innovations improves their costs
and performance, late starting alternatives have increasing difficulty catching up. Future
developments are partially locked-in to the direction set by early innovations.
3 Technological Progress and Non-Fossil Energy Sources
Of the six IIASA-WEC scenarios, only three are consistent with the UNFCCC goal of
climate stabilization.3 These are the C1 and C2 scenarios, which assume explicit policies to
limit carbon emissions, and the A3 Scenario, which does not. What the three stabilization
scenarios have in common are, first, significant technological progress particularly in energy
end-use and, second, a shift from fossil to non-fossil fuels. In this they well represent the
larger collection of scenarios in the literature that aspire to GHG stabilization consistent with
the UNFCCC. In the two Case C scenarios, this shift is largely policy driven by the
imposition of carbon taxes. In Scenario A3 the change is driven by economics, as more rapid
technological progress in non-fossil technologies makes them increasingly the preferred
choice of producers, consumers, and investors. The best indicator of technological progress in
Table 1 is the rate at which the global energy intensity improves, i.e., decreases. Historical
average improvements in those countries with enough long-term statistics to make the
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scenarios, improvements average 1.4% over the next 100 years, more than 50% faster than
the past long-term average. In Scenario A3, where stabilization comes later and at 550 ppmv
instead of 450 ppmv, energy intensity improvements essentially maintain the historical trend
around 0.9-1% per year, as they do in Scenarios A1 and A2. What makes the difference
among the Case A scenarios is that technological progress in Scenario A3 is focussed on non-
fossil fuels.
Energy intensity improvements are nonetheless an imperfect indicator of
technological progress because they combine the impacts of technological progress with
those of lifestyle changes and of economic structural shifts from highly energy-intensive
activities (like steel manufacturing) to ones that are less energy-intensive (like software
development). Imagine, for example, two alternatives. In one, the only change is that cars
                                                
3
 As spelled out in Section 5.1.3, the UNFCCC goal is actually stronger, calling for stabilization “at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UN, 1992 - Article 2). There is
not yet a consensus about what this means in terms of absolute stabilization levels for GHGs and the speed with
which they are attained. But stabilization at 450 ppmv before 2100 (Case C) and at 550 ppmv shortly after 2100
(Scenario A3) are within the range being considered.
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magically become twice as fuel efficient, cutting fuel consumption per passenger-kilometer in
half. In the other, the only change is that twice as many people suddenly begin riding in each
car, again cutting fuel consumption per passenger-kilometer in half. The first is exclusively a
technological change and the second exclusively a lifestyle change. But their effects on
energy intensity should be identical. In practice in the literature the more rapid a scenario’s
energy intensity improvements, the more likely it is to incorporate greater structural and
lifestyle changes as well as more rapid technological progress. The IIASA-WEC study’s
Scenarios C1 and C2, for example, imagine that the trend toward car leasing continues such
that car ownership in Western Europe by 2050 is quite low. People rent small highly efficient
vehicles for urban commutes and bigger, but still efficient, cars for weekends and longer
trips. A large part of longer distance travel is by public transportation, including efficient
high-speed rail.
But while it is impossible to separate technological, lifestyle, and structural changes in
most scenarios, it is fair to say that probably all scenarios aspiring to climate stabilization
incorporate rates of technological progress at least as rapid as those of the last century on
average -- and higher in the case of end-use and non-fossil technologies. Certainly that is the
overall message from the published literature. If there are scenarios in which radical changes
in lifestyles allow success independent of substantial improvements in technology, they are
certainly few and hard to find. Indeed well known scenarios that are even more ambitious
than the IIASA-WEC study’s Scenarios C1 and C2 are especially technology rich. In the
New Sustainability Paradigm of Gallopin et al. (1997) “highly efficient energy using
equipment become[s] the norm,” and, more quantitatively, the menu of possibilities for
accomplishing the Factor Four path of von Weizsäcker et al. (1997), in which energy
intensity improves at 4% per year, is heavily dominated by technological improvements.
Greenpeace’s Fossil Free Energy Future (Lazarus et al., 1993), in which energy intensity
improves at 2% per year for the initial four decades explicitly excludes “substantial lifestyle
shifts.”
In the above comparison between doubled fuel efficiency in cars and doubled
occupancy, technological and lifestyle changes were pure substitutes. More often they are
complementary. Technological advances in high-speed rail travel, for example, mean little if
they don’t attract additional riders to the trains. The interaction between the two will become
important later in this chapter when we examine how effective the Kyoto Protocol might be
in motivating the technological progress and shifts toward non-fossil energy that the energy
scenario literature indicates are necessary to meet the UNFCCC’s goal.
4 The Nature of Technological Progress
What matters then about the Kyoto Protocol and successive steps in the UNFCCC
negotiations is their effectiveness in motivating and accelerating technological progress in
energy supply and use, and motivating shifts toward non-fossil energy sources. Before
judging the Kyoto Protocol against these standards, it is helpful to review some features of
technological progress. The summary in this section depends heavily on Grübler’s analysis in
his book Technology and Global Change (Grübler, 1998). It concentrates on three points: the
difficulty of picking winners and the importance of letting “a thousand flowers bloom;” the
high cost and long time required for widespread diffusion; and the phenomenon of
technological lock-in.
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4.1 “Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom”
Technological progress is highly unpredictable, and failure is much more the norm
than success. In the initial stages of a technology’s lifecycle, there is usually a rich diversity
of contending designs, and picking winners is impossible. Sometimes there will be no
winners. Figure 8 shows some of over 1000 patented smoke spark arresters, inventions
intended to solve the problem of sparks from wood burning steam locomotives regularly
setting American forests ablaze. None of these designs ever enjoyed widespread success as
the problem of smoke sparks was solved not by any “add-on” technology in the form of a
smoke spark arrester, but by a radical technological change -- the replacement of steam by
diesel and electric power -- driven largely by other considerations. Unforeseen developments
even in apparently unrelated technologies effectively made a whole patent office worth of
smoke spark arrester designs obsolete in short order.
Figure 8: Some of the more than 1000 patented “smoke-spark arresters” for wood-
burning steam locomotives in the USA. Source: Basalla, 1988.
Even where there is an eventual winner, the initial design will change substantially
before it (temporarily) wins the race, and success depends on luck, ingenuity, and
perseverance. Consider, for example, the evolution of the bicycle from early designs such as
the 1878 Penny-farthing (huge front wheel, tiny back wheel) directed initially at a market
niche of “young men of means and nerve.” The 20-year evolution to today’s safe and
comfortable means of transportation that just about anyone can afford and ride depended, in
part, on inter-connected developments in related technologies such as Dunlop pneumatic tires
and the rear chain drive. It also depended on social developments and changing expectations
of both consumers and producers, each responding to the other, that broadened the bicycle’s
market beyond those “young men of means and nerve.” But it would be misleading to think
of this as simply a journey from an initial “bad” design to an eventual “good” design. The
initial design only got a chance to evolve because it appealed to a niche market through
which clever designers and entrepreneurs gained experience that they were able to turn into
alternative designs and wider appeal.
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4.2 Time and Money
Beyond the engineering, organizational, and entrepreneurial skill and adaptability, the
existence of niche markets, and the luck that are all important to technological success, there
are also the factors of money and perseverance. Figure 9 shows the costs of photovoltaics in
yen per watt installed capacity. Costs fell by almost a factor of 50 between 1973 and 1995,
but the investments necessary to accomplish those cost reductions have been large. As shown
on the horizontal axis in Figure 9, total expenditures exceed 200 billion yen in 1985 yen,
about US$2.5 billion. About 20% of that was spent on R&D, with the other 80% going into
tangible investments in niche market applications. And a lot more money still has to be
invested, even after more than 20 years, before photovoltaics will be competitive enough to
diffuse rapidly in mass markets. For energy technologies, with their relatively long lifetimes
and slow turnover rates, it can take forty years between a first application and widespread
diffusion -- as it has in the case of today’s preferred technological option for new electricity
	
&
	
et al., 1998a).
  
    
     
      
          
      	 
          
 	        
   
             




	











    
    ! " # $     	    	%   
   ! " #
  & ' ( '     
  & ) (  )  '  
    ( *    
    ( ) * 
    (   +  
 , 
           -      	
 
          
           
                   
Figure 9: Costs of photovoltaic modules, in yen, per watt installed capacity. Data
source: C. Watanabe, Tokyo Institute of Technology and IIASA. Source: IIASA, 1998.
One of the reasons diffusion can be slow is the interconnection between technologies
mentioned above. Automobiles, for example, depend on the oil industry to extract, refine, and
deliver their fuel. They depend on networks of suppliers for everything from steel and tires to
sophisticated electronics. They depend on roads, ferries, tunnels, and bridges. And they
depend on economies that include garage mechanics, driving instructors, licensing agencies,
traffic control, police, and traffic courts. The mismatch between new technologies (such as
natural gas cars) and old networks (such as petrol stations) slows the initial introduction of
new technologies, and it likewise slows subsequent technology transfer among regions of the
world. Because the free market is not always successful in coordinating the simultaneous
transfer of mutually supportive technology networks, this is a prime opportunity for
productive government involvement as discussed later in the chapter.
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4.3 Technological Lock-In
Finally is the phenomenon of lock-in. As an example, consider the QWERTY
keyboard -- the standard keyboard design in which the first six letters on the top row spell
QWERTY. This is certainly not the only possible arrangement of keys, and inventors have
offered alternatives advertised as ergonomically superior. But the QWERTY keyboard is as
pervasive as ever. At least two arguments are given for its success. First, when the QWERTY
keyboard was introduced, the mechanical hammers that actually struck the typewriter ribbon
and paper were less likely to jam together than was the case with other designs. Second, as its
popularity grew, the QWERTY keyboard became transformed into a standard. Typing courses
taught typing on QWERTY typewriters, businesses purchased QWERTY typewriters and
expected new recruits to be proficient on them, suppliers supplied them, and manufacturers
manufactured them. Now, particularly in computer applications, hammer-lock is hardly an
issue. But we are firmly locked in to the QWERTY design.
Though less important in the case of the QWERTY keyboard, there are at least two
other important contributors to technological lock-in beyond historical early technological
advantages (e.g., less hammer-lock) and the advantage of becoming the standard that
everyone learns, teaches, uses, and builds. Most important is the phenomenon of
technological learning -- as we gain experience producing any given technology, we
generally learn to make it better and cheaper. Production costs go down. Performance,
quality, and efficiency go up. The result can be technological lock-in. As experience with
early technological innovations improves their costs and performance, it widens their
advantage over later competitors and makes it increasingly difficult for late-starting
alternatives to catch up. The second other important contributor to technological lock-in can
be government regulation. If the government requires catalytic converters on every new car,
this both kills incentives for designing alternatives and dramatically increases the speed with
which experience with catalytic converters is gained, costs are reduced, and performance is
increased. Even if government regulations requiring catalytic converters were then replaced
with flexible emission limits, the technology would still be the de facto standard, although no
longer the de jure standard, and would have intimidating cost and performance advantages
over potential competitors with less experience.
5 The Kyoto Protocol and Incentives for Technological Progress
These then are the key features of technological progress that must be kept in mind by
the negotiators struggling to tie up the Kyoto Protocol’s many loose ends. The measure of
their labor will be the protocol’s (and its successors’) eventual success in motivating
sufficient technological progress and a sufficient shift from fossil to non-fossil fuels. To do
so, implementation of the protocol should encourage “a thousand flowers to bloom” in the
field of high-efficiency, low-carbon energy technologies; it should encourage early and
persevering investments in such technologies (recognizing that the lion’s share of
investments must go beyond R&D to tangible investments in niche markets as in Figure 9);
and it should try to exploit technological lock-in in favor of high-efficiency, low-carbon
technologies while frustrating tendencies that might lock in higher carbon futures.
How able the Kyoto Protocol is to accomplish all this will depend, in part, on how a
number of current debates get resolved. The ones likely to be most important concern, first,
the specifics of Kyoto’s flexibility mechanisms and, second, how willing the developing
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countries (the non-Annex I countries) will be to take on obligations to limit their GHG
emissions.
5.1 Flexibility Mechanisms
There are three flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol: emission trading, Joint
Implementation (JI)4, and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Their principal
purpose is to reduce the costs of meeting the Kyoto limits or, in economic terminology, to
increase efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Flexibility mechanisms make use of the fact that it
is more expensive to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in some countries than in others. It
costs less, for example, to replace an old inefficient dirty power plant in China or Russia by
current technology than it does to squeeze equivalent emission reductions out of the newest
state-of-the-art Japanese facility.
This creates the possibility for win-win trades. Russia (or China) should be willing to
take on some of Japan’s obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at a price that, first,
pays Russia (or China) more than it spends on the reductions and, second, costs Japan less
than it would spend on the same reductions at home. One side makes money, the other side
saves money, and it makes no difference to the environment that greenhouse gas emissions
are reduced in Russia or China instead of Japan.
Of the three flexibility mechanisms, emission trading is allowed only among Annex I
countries (which would include Russia and Japan in the above example, but not China). Joint
Implementation also applies only to Annex I countries, and allows one Annex I country to get
credit for reducing its own GHG emissions by investing in a GHG-reducing project located in
another Annex I country. CDM, the Clean Development Mechanism, allows an Annex I
country to get credit by investing in a GHG-reducing project located in a non-Annex I
country. Because JI and CDM are intended to credit emission reductions beyond any
reductions that would have happened anyway without the incentives of JI and CDM, these
options involve the tricky issue of defining baselines -- i.e., the “reductions that would have
happened anyway without the incentives.” All three flexibility mechanisms share the
difficulty of measuring or calculating emissions and verifying promised reductions. The same
would be true for the Kyoto Protocol limits standing on their own, stripped of any flexibility
mechanisms.
Detailed rules and guidelines for the three flexibility mechanisms have yet to be
worked out, and the Fourth Conference of the Parties (COP-4) in Buenos Aires in 1998 made
only limited progress. The current target for having detailed rules and guidelines completed is
the Sixth Conference of the Parties (COP-6). COP-6 is currently scheduled for October 2000
in The Hague, although the U.S. would like to postpone it until after the November 2000 U.S.
presidential election. Of the differences that need to be resolved, the largest is between the
EU and the “Umbrella Group” (a fluid group usually including at least Australia, Japan, and
the U.S.) over capping the amount of emission trading an Annex I country can use to bring its
emissions beneath its Kyoto limit. The EU prefers a strict interpretation of the
“supplementarity” provision in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol:
                                                
4
 The Kyoto Protocol never uses the phrase “Joint Implementation.” Nor does it use the phrase “Activities
Implemented Jointly” or its acronym, AIJ, which refer to the pilot phase for AIJ established at the First
Conference of the Parties (COP-1). In keeping with what appears now to be common practice, this chapter will
use JI to refer to the flexibility mechanism described in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol.
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“The Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading for the
purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be
supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting emission limitation reduction
commitments under that Article” (UN, 1997).5
Specifically, going into the May 31 - June 11, 1999 Tenth Session of the UNFCCC
Subsidiary Bodies in Bonn, the EU proposed that “supplemental” be defined as less than half.
The Umbrella Group interprets “supplemental” more literally, finding in the word no
implication, much less a requirement, that such supplemental reductions be limited in any
way. The arguments in the debate cover theoretical, practical, and ethical considerations. The
next three sections address each in turn.
5.1.1 Theoretical Considerations
The principal theoretical argument against caps is that they reduce economic
efficiency. As stated above, trading means that emissions can be reduced wherever reductions
cost the least -- at least within the Annex I countries. Since the pattern of reductions resulting
from unrestricted trading would, at least in theory, be the absolutely least expensive way to
comply with Kyoto’s limits, restrictions on trading can only make things more expensive.
One rebuttal from those favoring caps is that short-term efficiency (in the sense of
minimizing costs) does not lead to the technological progress discussed above as essential to
climate stabilization. Under emission trading programs in the United States, for example,
utilities can meet emission reduction targets by buying and junking old highly polluting
automobiles. This is cheaper than developing new technologies, and therefore more efficient,
but it does little to promote technological progress. Similarly, if Russia and Ukraine are
allowed to sell all their hot air to countries such as the U.S. and Japan, the short-term results
may be compliance with the Kyoto limits and savings for all parties to the trade, but lower
incentives in the U.S. and Japan for technological progress. In the long-run, argue the critics
of unrestricted trading, those reduced incentives will mean slower technological progress,
less likelihood of meeting the UNFCCC climate stabilization goal, and higher ultimate costs.
They may also lead to what Hourcade and Le Pesant (1999) call “dynamic inconsistency” in
which slow initial technological progress due to cheap trading makes future stricter emission
limits prohibitively expensive to countries like the U.S. Such countries could fail to develop
the technologies needed to meet, at a cost they consider acceptable, the stricter limits that
might be required several decades hence. Indeed most economically optimal GHG reduction
paths push the bulk of the reductions to the second half of the 21st century when, among
other things, technological progress is assumed to have made them cheaper (e.g., Wigley et
al., 1996). Hourcade and Le Pesant fear that in the face of excessive costs because of their
technological lag, countries such as the U.S. would drop out of the UNFCCC process or
otherwise cause global efforts to abate potential climate change to unravel.
Which side of the theoretical argument you prefer depends on how perfect you
imagine the future emission trading market will be. There are good reasons to expect that it
                                                
5
 The Kyoto Protocol refers sometimes to Annex I of the UNFCCC and sometimes to Annex B of the Kyoto
Protocol. Essentially the parties listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC are required to meet the limits listed in Annex
B of the Kyoto Protocol. There are two Annex I countries not included in Annex B, Belarus and Turkey. As
Annex I countries they can presumably participate in emission trading and JI, although they have no Kyoto
Protocol commitments of their own. This chapter uses the phrase “Annex I countries” to refer interchangeably to
the countries of Annex I or Annex B. Such usage is not precise, but it is less confusing and wordy than the
alternative.
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will be “sufficiently perfect.” Because emission permits can be shipped electronically,
delivery costs are effectively zero. Moreover, a number of institutions have already entered
the competition to become either the central trading exchange or leaders in brokering and
auditing emission reductions (e.g., Times of London, 1999; Inter Press Service, 1999; Sydney
Morning Herald, 1999), and the experience they are accumulating should steadily decrease
transaction costs associated with finding accurate market information and trading partners.
Market proponents also argue that unrestricted trading shifts the incentives for
emission-reducing technological progress to those who can make such progress most cost-
effectively. Here the arguments based on economic theory may get too impractical even for
those inclined toward free market solutions. It may be true that assuming well-defined,
smooth regional production functions for R&D within an equally well-defined
macroeconomic model shows that unrestricted emission trading in a perfect market causes
R&D investments to migrate to where they generate the greatest assumed return, e.g., FSU
and developing countries (Buonanno et al., 1999). But it is neither terribly surprising, nor
pragmatically convincing, as the assumption of perfect markets and well-defined R&D
production functions in these countries is something of a stretch. For the skeptics in this case,
several anecdotes may be more persuasive in making the case that unrestricted trading may
be at least as good an incentive for technological progress as trading caps.
“Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) completed a
unique trade with Arizona Public Service (APS) in which APS transferred
20,000 sulfur dioxide (SO2) allowances to NMPC, and in return, APS
received 2.5 million tons of CO2 reductions from NMPC. The CO2
emission reductions made by NMPC are below 1990 levels and have been
recognized by the Department of Energy as applying toward APS’s
voluntary greenhouse gas reduction commitment. As a consequence of the
transfer, the two companies pursued other environmental health benefits.
First, instead of releasing the SO2 into the atmosphere, NMPC donated the
20,000 SO2 allowances to three non-profit environmental organizations to
be permanently taken off the market. Second, the tax benefit associated
with the donation, expected to be about $650,000, will be reinvested in
projects which will further reduce CO2, including a CO2 reduction project
in Mexico. This trade illustrates how quickly businesses internalize the
concepts of emissions trading and identify market opportunities that would
never be realized under strict command-and-control regulation…
“International Fuel Cells [IFC] views emissions trading as a means
to catalyze an innovative financing strategy to increases their sales. [IFC],
a subsidiary of United Technologies, designs, manufactures, and sells
commercial fuel cell power plants that produce electricity and cogenerated
heat. Their product produces virtually zero air pollutants and, because of
its high efficiency, helps reduce greenhouse gas emissions. IFC seeks to
pool the emissions reductions achieved by each of its customers, broker
trades, and use the proceeds to discount the price of the fuel cells to those
customers. This example reveals the potential of emissions reductions
markets to stimulate the financing of investments in newer and cleaner
technologies such as fuel cells” (Knopman and Susman, 1998).
There is a second theoretical argument for capping emission trading -- it will lead to
absolutely lower carbon emissions during the Kyoto budget period, 2008-2012. Caps will
19
force some Annex I countries to make domestic reductions they would otherwise cover by
buying hot air, but the reductions in Russia and elsewhere that constitute that hot air will be
unchanged. The net result will be greater absolute reductions than with unrestricted emission
trading. There are two rebuttals that critics of caps might offer. First, the same additional
reductions would be accomplished more efficiently if they were included in the limits set in
Kyoto and then met using a system with unrestricted trading. Second, the additional carbon
reduction between 2008 and 2012 is likely to be heavily outweighed by the additional
reductions made possible in the long run through uncapped emission trading that assures that
each euro devoted to carbon reduction will be spent in the most efficient way.
5.1.2 Practical Considerations
Second are the practical considerations surrounding trading caps. There are those in
Europe who consider that too many powerful Americans are already beyond ever being
persuaded to see the merits of capping emission trading. Noting that U.S. ratification is
essential for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force,6 they argue it is necessary, and therefore
in this case desirable, to trade away the trading cap in exchange for U.S. participation. Bohm
(1999) also argues that lowering the costs of meeting the Kyoto limits (by allowing
unrestricted trading) makes it easier for Annex I countries to accept more stringent future
limits than they might otherwise. He also notes that unrestricted trading, by raising the
prospective revenues of emission permit sellers, increases the incentives for non-Annex I
countries to join the protocol.
The biggest practical argument in favor of caps may be that they would limit a
potentially huge and unrestricted windfall that might otherwise prove counterproductive to
Russia and Ukraine. With sufficient transparency and accountability, permit revenues could
reinforce economic progress and responsible institutions in those countries, but without
sufficient transparency and accountability, large windfall revenues could undercut progress.
To the extent they undermine current incentives for reform and discipline, they risk becoming
partly counterproductive.
5.1.3 Ethical Considerations
The ethical objection of Europeans to unrestricted emission trading is that it allows
some countries (read the U.S.) to effectively buy their way out of reducing their carbon
emissions, and that’s not fair! The argument is that those countries that have created the
problem through their high carbon emissions during the last century have a responsibility to
clean themselves up first. This is recognized in Articles 3 and 4 of the UNFCCC (quoted
below), which commit the developed countries to taking the lead in reducing GHG emissions.
For the U.S. to meet its Kyoto limit by buying up large quantities of unused “emission
reduction units” from countries in severe economic recessions is seen as something distinctly
less than the leadership required by the UNFCCC.
                                                
6
 Formally, the Kyoto Protocol will enter into force 90 days after 55 countries have ratified it, including enough
to account for 55% of Annex I CO2 emissions in 1990. The U.S. accounted for 36% of Annex I CO2 emissions
in 1990, with Western Europe and the former Soviet bloc each accounting for 25%. It is theoretically possible
for the protocol to enter into force without the U.S., but politically unlikely. As of August 27, 1999, the protocol
had been ratified by 14 countries, mostly small island states and none a significant GHG emitter.
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The issue of fairness in the UNFCCC process is extremely important, affecting not
just the debate about whether to cap emission trading, but also nearly all other aspects of
implementing the Kyoto Protocol and negotiating subsequent steps. For that reason, this
section goes beyond fairness in emission trading to address the rather unusual role that the
UNFCCC text assigns to fairness considerations, how such considerations appear in the
Kyoto Protocol, and how such considerations might play out in subsequent negotiations.
The general nature of international negotiations (some would argue of all
negotiations) is that no country is compelled to agree to a proposal that, all things considered,
it does not consider to be to its advantage. If the proposal on the table does not offer you a net
gain compared to your current situation, then don’t sign. Negotiations are in essence about
joint gains. Each and every party to an agreement should be better off after the agreement,
judged by their own standards and taking all factors into account, or they should not take part
in the agreement. Notice that fairness does not enter into this description. Although
negotiators will appeal to various principles of fairness in any negotiation (more on this
later), international negotiators to not generally come together to make the world a more fair
place. They come together to strike deals that will make each of their countries better off.
They came together to negotiate the UNFCCC to protect their countries -- which involves
protecting other countries as well -- from all the potential impacts of climate change. Such
protection is something that most agree can be better done cooperatively than unilaterally.
That is what motivated the UNFCCC.
The UNFCCC, however, and the process of implementing its objectives through
negotiating specific binding protocols, contain a few features that give additional importance
to issues of fairness. In short, the convention frames the problem as one of collectively
deciding on a safe level at which to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations, and then
working out a fair division of the burdens required to meet that safe level. The convention
text gives some guidelines about what should be considered safe and what should be
considered fair, but, as is evident from the following excerpts, it leaves many more questions
up in the air.
“Article 2: Objective
The ultimate objective… is to achieve… stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to
proceed in a sustainable manner…
“Article 3.1
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and
in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects
thereof…
“Article 4.2(a)
Each of these Parties [Annex I Parties] shall adopt national
policies and take corresponding measures… [that] will demonstrate that
developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends
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in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the
Convention… and taking into account the differences in these Parties’
starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases,
the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available
technologies and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for
equitable and appropriate contributions by each of these Parties to the
global effort regarding that objective…” (UN, 1992).
This framing of the problem -- collectively determining a safe stabilization level and
then a fair division of the costs -- creates a number of difficulties. First, there is no objective
answer to the question of how safe is safe enough, even if all scientific uncertainties could be
eliminated. It is itself a subject for negotiation as individuals -- and countries -- will answer it
differently. Partly this is a matter of different tastes and aversions to risk -- in the words of
the revisionist “Don’t do unto others as you would have them do unto you. They may have
different tastes.” Partly it is a function of how the costs of increasing safety, and the benefits
that result, fall differently on different parties. This means that the first part of the task set by
the UNFCCC is inextricably tied to the second, agreeing on a fair division of burdens.
The difficulty in agreeing to a fair division of burdens is that there is no fair division
principle that is both theoretically and practically perfect. Quite a few fair division principles
exist, from the very simple (“split the difference” or “first come, first served”) to the more
complex and philosophical. Many have been analyzed in terms of their implications for
burden sharing under the UNFCCC and other environmental agreements (Young, 1994; Rose
et al., 1998; Torvanger and Godal, 1999). Young (1994) organizes contending fair division
principles into three categories: parity (sharing a burden equally among all parties),
proportionality (sharing the burden in proportion to, for example, the parties’ abilities to pay,
or their current emission levels, or their populations), and priority (allocating the burden
principally to one party, as in the polluter-pays principle). Rarely do negotiators proceed by
first agreeing on a particular fair division principle, then applying it to their problem and
completing the deal. Much more realistic is the case where various fair division principles
serve as focal points around which the negotiators coordinate their expectations. If the seller
of a used car, for example, states his asking price, and the buyer responds with a lower offer,
both will immediately calculate the midpoint of the two offers. They may not move to the
midpoint immediately or even eventually, but the fairness principle of “splitting the
difference” (parity) makes the midpoint a significant (if unspoken) reference point. If two
business partners are negotiating about how to divide future profits, a division proportional to
their investments will almost certainly be an important reference point, spoken or unspoken.
In the UNFCCC negotiations we see appeals to fairness principles within all three categories.
Parity of emission rights in the form of an identical per capita emission entitlement for each
individual has been advocated by some developing countries. Proportionality principles of
several sorts are combined in the Kyoto Protocol. First, limits are defined in terms of
percentage reductions from actual emissions in 1990, making reductions in part proportional
to 1990 levels. Then overlaid on this proportional allocation is another based on how
burdensome reductions in different countries were judged to be. Thus Iceland’s limit is 10%
higher than its 1990 emissions, and the EU’s is 8% below 1990. Priority is reflected in the
requirement that the developed countries take the lead in reducing emissions.
None of this is to say that the Kyoto Protocol represents an elegant blending,
explicitly crafted by the parties, of simpler fairness principles. The argument is that fairness
principles that appeal in one way or another to parity, proportionality, or priority become
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focal points around which negotiators frame their arguments and proposals. Each is
emphasizing principles that serve her interests -- the G-77 may argue for national reductions
proportional to cumulative per capita emissions since the start of the Industrial Revolution,
and the OECD may argue for reductions proportional only to current annual emissions (or
better yet a prior year with higher OECD emissions). And each is using what political power
he has to nudge (or shove) the outcome further in his favor. But the exercise of power and the
pursuit of self-interest are not unrestrained. However contentious the negotiation process and
messy the eventual compromise, both are guided by appeals to parity, proportionality, and
priority.
To this first proposition -- that no single fairness principle is both theoretically and
practically perfect, and that alternative fairness principles serve as focal points around which
negotiators can coordinate expectations -- let me add a second. That is that successful
negotiations often happen in stages. They start with straightforward applications of
uncomplicated fairness principles. These tend to be relatively blunt instruments that leave
many joint gains on the table. As negotiators learn more about each other’s interests and
abilities (and perhaps come to trust each other more), they manage to overlay additional
fairness principles on top of the original agreement that capture and share these joint gains
and make all parties better off. Consider the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution (LRTAP), adopted in Geneva in November 1979. The first quantitative pollution
reduction agreement under LRTAP came in 1985 when a number of European countries plus
Canada (a group that became known as the 30% Club) agreed to reduce national sulfur
emissions or transboundary fluxes by at least 30%, in 1993 relative to 1980 (UN, 1985). This
is straightforward proportionality. Everyone’s reduction is proportional to her status quo
emissions in 1980. It was also economically inefficient. Squeezing additional reductions out
of more modern Western European facilities was generally more expensive than eliminating
the same amount of pollution through improving many aging facilities in Eastern Europe. But
a more complicated -- and efficient -- protocol was politically out of reach. By 1994,
however, after almost a decade of joint analysis and cooperative experience, essentially the
same countries were able to negotiate the Second Sulfur Protocol (UN/ECE, 1994). In this,
percentage reduction requirements (in 2000 relative to 1980) range from 0% for Portugal and
Greece to 83% for Germany, and very few countries have identical requirements. But the
benefit is a net gain for everyone, taking into account both their environmental and financial
interests. The price of these joint gains is the added complexity of making reduction
requirements partially proportional to their impact on ecosystems -- rather than just the 1980
status quo emissions.
The immediate application of these propositions to the ethics of capping emission
trading is that advocates of unrestricted trading can argue that no overriding fairness principle
exists to which their critics can now appeal to trump the compromise worked out in Kyoto.
The Kyoto Protocol was an exercise in negotiating joint gains. It was certainly shaped --
although not determined -- by focal points implied by a variety of fairness principles. But it
was a package agreed to by the U.S. and other negotiators because each calculated the
agreement, as a package, to be in its own self-interest. Assuming unrestricted emission
trading, the U.S. judged itself better off with the agreement than without when all the
benefits, costs, and political implications were taken into account. To restrict trading now
would be, in the eyes of the U.S., to increase its costs after the fact. That the U.S. argues,
appealing to another fairness principle, is simply not fair.
The prospective sellers of emission reduction units are on the same side of the above
argument as the prospective buyers. The EU’s proposed trading caps would erect trade
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barriers restricting exports from the likely producers of emission reduction units, like Russia
and Ukraine, even before the new commodity is fully created. In reality it is unlikely that
Russia and Ukraine’s calculations concerning the Kyoto Protocol turned as finely on
estimates of their new exports as the U.S.’s did on estimates of its new imports. They have
certainly not been as vocal as the U.S. in resisting the EU’s proposals.
Section 6 on “Next Steps” will return to the role that might be played by fairness
issues. But one final possible rebuttal to ethical criticisms of unrestricted emission trading
should be cited to complete the discussion. It is the economic argument that the unborn
generations, particularly in the developing world, who are to be the principal beneficiaries of
the Kyoto Protocol will also benefit critically from economic development in the meantime.
Inefficient global carbon reductions can only slow that development relative to efficient
global carbon reductions. If the most ethical approach is that which most benefits those
unborn generations whose climate is being molded by our emissions, then unrestricted
trading should be preferred. It delivers the same emission reductions as does restricted
trading, but is less of a drag on economic development. Richels et al. (1996) offer a
quantitative version of essentially the same argument in calculating that, because of trade
effects, the economic slowdown in the OECD caused by emission limits with no trading
would spill over and incur costs in non-OECD countries -- even when they have no
limitations on their own emissions. Indeed it can be argued that true equity would require not
just unrestricted trading, but also including developing countries as legitimate sellers. In this
case, the developing countries would receive tremendous trading revenues (Nordhaus and
Boyer, 1999) and boost their development prospects even more.
5.2 Participation of Developing Countries
The second critical debate concerns “meaningful participation” by developing
countries. In the 1997 Byrd-Hagel resolution, the U.S. Senate effectively promised, by a 95-0
vote, not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol unless it “mandates new specific scheduled
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties
within the same compliance period [as for Annex I parties]” (Congressional Record, 1997).
The Clinton administration has reframed the issue somewhat, by promising to secure
“meaningful contributions” from the developing countries before submitting the protocol for
Senate ratification. But the developing countries take the position that they will only
participate if there is first an acceptable agreement on equity considerations. As stated by
Shukla (1999), “The aim of climate negotiations is to minimize the welfare losses and not the
emissions or mitigation costs alone. Minimizing the welfare losses requires dealing up front
with equity -- that is, the distribution of [the] total welfare burden, including the distribution
of side payments. This is the basic aspect of [the] developing country perspective in climate
negotiations… The substantial issue in global negotiations, then, is not efficiency but
distribution or equity.” In a “non-paper” at the 1998 SBSTA7 meeting in Bonn, the G-77 took
the position, that “Until the question of emission rights and entitlements has been addressed
equitably, it will not be possible to have emission trading.” This ties their concern about
equity directly to the negotiation issue closest to America’s heart.
Equity principles that appeal to developing countries include those that would allocate
GHG emission entitlements in proportion to population or assure net welfare gains inversely
proportional to a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Shukla, 1999; Rose et al., 1998;
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Torvanger and Godal, 1999). The implications of the first are relatively easy to calculate,
although operational proposals along these lines usually envision a requirement that per
capita GHG emissions converge over time on a common value by a common date. The
convergence value, date, and differentiated paths for developed and developing countries
would be consistent with climate stabilization at a safe level, but otherwise open to
negotiation. For the second principle even the calculations are much harder. Given the
hundreds of billions of dollars in international transfers that would be at stake, the prospect of
an agreed consensus projection, nation-by-nation, of the future net welfare impacts of
uncertain mitigation costs, and even more uncertain mitigation benefits, is remote to say the
least. But whether based on equal per capita emission entitlements or net welfare gains
inversely proportional to GDP, these options all involve huge transfers from developed to
developing countries as a matter of right -- as indeed the developing countries argue that any
equitable arrangement should.
The previous section argued that negotiators seldom start by working out a consensus
on an overall definition of fairness to guide their efforts. Nor is it important that the final
product conform to some shared overriding fairness principle (although each party will
invoke useful, and often different, fairness principles when selling an agreement to their
constituency at home). Victor (1999) is more blunt, “Conventional wisdom holds that fair
agreements are more effective… conventional wisdom is largely incorrect.” Insistence by
developing countries on reaching an overriding agreement on equity first would thus seem to
create two very large hurdles for the Kyoto Protocol and its prospective successors. First, it
puts agreement on an overriding definition of equity front and center, contrary to historical
practice in successful international negotiations big and small. Second, the definitions of
equity proposed by the developing countries are extremely expensive for the North -- many
would say prohibitively expensive. Estimates of what it would cost the OECD to buy
emission permits in the event of per capita entitlements and a 20% reduction in global
emissions by 2010 relative to 1990 (admittedly a much tighter criterion than the Kyoto
Protocol), run over US$100 billion per year (Rose et al., 1998). This is much higher than the
Russian bubble’s prospective cost, cited above, of US$100 billion over the whole Kyoto
budget period.
The hurdle created by the Byrd-Hagel resolution in the U.S. seems equally high.
Victor (1999) argues that the variable that best explains differential contributions to
international environmental agreements is willingness to pay. He also notes that wealthy
countries are usually more willing to pay for environmental protection.8 Consistent with this
observation, developing countries have demonstrated a very low willingness to pay for
potential climate change abatement in view of more immediate environmental problems with
air, water, and land pollution, not to mention pressing non-environmental issues of health,
education, and economic growth.  Nor are developing countries likely to start behaving like
rich environmentalists any time soon.
The task then is to find a path forward from Kyoto that promises to motivate the
technological progress found necessary in the scenario literature, while dodging both the
Scylla of the trans-Atlantic emission trading spat and the Charybdis of the standoff between
the South insisting on equity first and the U.S. Senate holding the Kyoto Protocol hostage to
developing country commitments starting in 2008. In addition, success may depend on
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 This leads to an empirical correlation between contributions and wealth that has led some analysts to discern
fairness principles at work when, Victor contends, they should really see only variations in willingness to pay.
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making politically palatable the huge transfers of cash to Russia and Ukraine implied by
unrestricted emission trading.
The final sections of this chapter attempt to offer one possible “rosy scenario” that a
country pondering this task might want to choose. The intent is to pursue the lessons
extracted from the chapter’s opening review of the scenario literature -- that technological
progress, particularly in low- and non-fossil technologies, is the key to success. But this rosy
scenario must also take into account the political constraints discussed above, and their
theoretical and practical impact on technological progress. Section 6 starts by considering a
strategy based on the two IIASA-WEC Case C scenarios that clearly comply with the Kyoto
Protocol, moves on to the one other IIASA-WEC scenario that promises long-term climate
stabilization (Scenario A3), and then focuses on how a country might make parallel progress
at home and in UNFCCC negotiations to see the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms put
to politically acceptable productive use.
6 Next Steps
The IIASA-WEC study describes its two Case C scenarios as “rich and green.” Of the
six scenarios, these are the ones most in line with the green agenda. Carbon emissions drop
most steeply, the income gap between North and South narrows the most, and, in the C1
Scenario, nuclear power disappears. The South develops faster than in the muddling-through
Case B, and the OECD manages a steadily improving standard of living with a steadily
declining consumption of energy. In the words of the study there is “unprecedented
international cooperation centered explicitly on environmental protection and international
equity.” Measured solely on projected GHG emissions, a Case C strategy (with or without
nuclear power) matches best the goal of the UNFCCC. Of the IIASA-WEC study’s six
scenarios, only C1 and C2 promise clear compliance with the Kyoto Protocol and CO2
stabilization as low as 450 ppmv.
But in deciding whether to choose a Case C strategy, one must also weigh the
likelihood of success. Here Case C presents difficulties. It envisions transfers from the OECD
to developing countries climbing from about 0.5% of the OECD’s GDP in 2000 to
approximately 5% by 2100. Those are big numbers, especially compared to the present
(unmet) UN guideline of 0.7% for official development aid (ODA). The money transferred to
the South would come from sweeping carbon and energy taxes or their regulatory
equivalents. Political agreement on energy and carbon taxes is still proving elusive for even
the relatively green EU. For America’s taxophobic Congress, which in 1995 provided ODA
equal to only 0.12% of U.S. GDP (down from 0.20% in 1991), it will be even more difficult
to negotiate major new taxes solely to produce revenues to be sent abroad. The U.S. Congress
is still withholding US$1.7 billion in dues owed to the UN, the Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel
resolution 95-0, and many members of Congress would see an increase in ODA as pouring
good money into a black hole.
The large North-to-South transfers incorporated in Case C depress OECD economic
growth below even its modest level in the muddling-through Case B. The arguments for
undertaking this sacrifice are faster economic development in the South and a reduced danger
of climate change. However, faster development in the South is uncertain and politically
remote, and the serious impacts of climate change are still decades away even in the most
pessimistic scenarios. In a world of 2- to 6-year election cycles in the public sector and of
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ever shortening holding periods and day traders in the world’s stock exchanges, the near-term
prospects for such arguments proving persuasive would seem slim to none.
Case C is also not necessarily terribly appealing to the South. Although for the
developing regions, per capita income grows in Case C faster than in Case B, it is still behind
the pace of Case A. To the (very large) extent that developing regions place economic growth
ahead of the long-term risk of global warming, they are likely to find the incentive offered by
the North in Case C insufficient to turn them away from higher growth ambitions as
exemplified by Case A. Indeed several of the expert teams from developing regions that
WEC assembled to review preliminary study results considered even the study’s Case A
growth rates too low for their regions. Case C is thus a difficult strategy to sell in the South as
well as the North.
This may be the reason for Case C’s final difficulty -- it is already almost 10 years
behind schedule. In the IIASA-WEC study, Case C policies were assumed to start in 1990.
Obviously they did not. The delay does not undercut the basic arguments for Case C. In the
short term, a delayed Case C could still meet the schedule of the Kyoto Protocol. In Figure 5,
even if the Case C trajectories are moved 10 years to the right and adjusted for Annex I
emission changes since 1990, they still will meet the Kyoto limits (although emission trading
may become more important than it would have been). In the long term, even delaying
implementation of Case C for another 10 years to 2010 would only add 20 GtC to Case C’s
cumulative (1990 to 2100) emissions of 540 GtC. This would still result in the CO2
concentration stabilizing below 450 ppmv. But while the substantive arguments for Case C
hold despite the 10-year delay, the lack of progress towards Case C policies in the eight years
since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro argues against Case C as a realistic option.
Remember also that in addition to being a political optimist at this stage, an advocate of a
Case C strategy must also be a technological optimist -- it incorporates energy intensity
improvements averaging 1.4% per year, less ambitious than Greenpeace (Lazarus et al.,
1993) and Factor Four (von Weizsäcker et al., 1997) but still over 50% more ambitious than
the long-term historical average.
An alternative to a Case C strategy is the example of Scenario A3. In Scenario A3 the
energy supply shifts away from fossil fuels because of economics, not resource constraints,
and the best argument for Scenario A3 is perhaps the increasing belief in business circles that
carbon reduction is a smart business objective. Business has always pursued increased
efficiency (although they have not always striven to motivate their customers to do the same),
but their interest in “carbon efficiency” is new. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change,
for example, was created in 1998, and its 21-member Business Environmental Leadership
Council includes such established names as ABB, Boeing, BP Amoco, DuPont, Enron, Shell,
Toyota, and PG&E Corporation. The first two principles of the Council’s Joint Statement
read:
“1. We accept the views of most scientists that enough is known about the
science and environmental impacts of climate change for us to take actions to address
its consequences.
“2. Businesses can and should take concrete steps now in the U.S. and abroad
to assess opportunities for emission reductions, establish and meet emission reduction
objectives, and invest in new, more efficient products, practices and technologies.”
BP Amoco has adopted a goal of reducing the company’s GHG emissions by 10%
from 1990 to 2010 and has already implemented an internal emission trading system in order
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to reach that goal most efficiently. Note that a 10% reduction is more aggressive than any
national limit agreed to in the Kyoto Protocol (although several countries have internal goals
that are more ambitious than their formal Kyoto commitments). Even more aggressive are
Shell’s objective of a 10% reduction between 1990 and 2002 and DuPont’s goal of a 65%
reduction between 1990 and 2010.
Ten years ago few would have predicted such behavior. Economists would argue that
no rational firm should invest money to reduce carbon emissions as long as carbon emissions
are free. Doing so would put the firm at a disadvantage relative to competitors not wasting
money on reducing outputs that could be disposed of freely in unlimited quantities. Only if
governments act to internalize the costs of carbon emissions by instituting taxes, requiring
emission permits, or mandating emission limits or control technologies should a rational firm
react. That was the logic then. Rather than conclude now that companies like BP Amoco,
Shell, and DuPont are irrational, the more popular explanation of investments in carbon
reduction is that these companies are indeed very rational, and are rationally hedging against,
or even betting on, the possibility that governments will internalize carbon emission costs.
Many Annex I countries now have policies and goals with carbon reduction targets, most of
them have voluntary programs to encourage reductions or have increased RD&D targeted on
reducing carbon emissions, and a few have actually imposed carbon or energy taxes. They
have signed the Kyoto Protocol, and a prudent businessman should therefore anticipate that
the costs of carbon emissions will (or at least might) be internalized and prepare accordingly.
This interpretation is reinforced by the efforts of active businesses to assure that they get
credit against future carbon reduction mandates for their anticipatory earlier reductions. It is
also reinforced by the emission trading that is already taking place (see examples above and
in the references) as firms, seeking an advantage in the carbon-constrained economy that they
anticipate, move to snap up the cheapest carbon reduction opportunities early.
Indeed the private sector appears to be out ahead of the public sector, particularly in
the field of emission trading. While negotiators in Buenos Aires, Bonn, and elsewhere
struggle to agree before 2001 on the details of particularly the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms
(but also other troublesome items such as GHG sinks), the companies listed above, and
others, have already gained initial experience in finding emission trading partners, finding
auditors and brokers, finding mechanisms to register trades and establish legitimacy, and
completing trades. As the number of such trades grows so do the incentives and the expertise
of ancillary businesses -- auditors, brokers, and exchanges. Together, they make a growing
lobby with an increasingly vested interest in seeing emission limits implemented and full
emission trading accepted. They will have invested significantly to gain an advantage in a
carbon-constrained business environment, and to make those investments pay off, they will
likely also spend political capital to assure that governments indeed create exactly that
carbon-constrained business environment.9 Such a lobby may be particularly important in
persuading a key player, the U.S., to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and remain engaged in the
process of developing the next steps to be taken in implementing the overall UNFCCC. Right
now, the argument against the Kyoto Protocol in the U.S. is largely that it will disadvantage
the U.S. economy and hurt U.S. competitiveness due to increased costs. A business lobby
arguing that carbon constraints, properly implemented, would be an important competitive
advantage would be a significant counter-argument.
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 Experience with the Montreal Protocol to reduce ozone depleting substances may be a good precedent. Victor
(1999) notes that “even the U.S., UN debtor par excellence,” has fully paid its contribution to the protocol’s
voluntary Multilateral Fund. He comments, “If America did not pay, environmental groups, as well as firms that
have in invested in ozone-benign technologies, would crucify the government.”
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For a country seeking to marry a Scenario A3 strategy to the UNFCCC process and
the Kyoto Protocol, it would seem sensible to encourage and facilitate the initiatives of
companies seeking an early advantage in a carbon-constrained business environment. First,
encouraging such initiatives motivates exactly the sort of investments in low- and non-carbon
technological progress that are required in all scenarios that accomplish climate stabilization.
And the earlier these investments are made the more potential they have for partially locking
future progress in to a low-carbon development path. This lock-in potential has a
technological and economic dimension -- more early experience will likely translate into
quicker cost and performance improvements and ever-wider applications. It also has a social
or political dimension -- as the networks of suppliers, customers, repairers, installers,
financiers, trainers, brokers, auditors, other intermediaries, and lobbyists grow, so does their
appetite for more business with the technologies they know best. Thus reinforcement of
business initiatives representing early movement in a Scenario A3 direction would seem
eminently desirable from a long-term perspective. Reinforcement should include at the very
least mechanisms by which early reductions can be reassuringly certified (as the Niagara
Mohawk - Arizona Public Service reductions were by the U.S. DOE’s voluntary reductions
program) even if such certification cannot be formally recognized by the UNFCCC before the
international negotiations are complete.10 Or it could go further to institute domestic tradable
permit programs both to build experience and to send price signals to “strengthen the
incentive for technological innovation that is essential for future emission reductions” (Kopp
et al., 1999).
Reinforcement of such initiatives also has at least two short-term advantages. It
cultivates a business lobby that may be essential to assuring especially U.S. ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol, and it makes immediate progress towards implementing the sort of emission
trading needed to bring at least the IIASA-WEC Scenario A3 into compliance with the Kyoto
Protocol. Failure on either of these fronts -- U.S. ratification of the Kyoto Protocol or actual
compliance in 2008-2012 with Kyoto’s limits -- would be a serious blow to international
cooperation to stabilize the climate.
But a successful marriage of a Scenario A3 strategy and the Kyoto Protocol will
require more than reinforcing early private initiatives. It will also require the expansion of
Joint Implementation (JI) projects among Annex I countries and aggressive initiation of
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in developing countries. The short-term
arguments for JI and CDM are that the former may be an essential step in making emission
trading politically palatable in general, while the latter may be essential for U.S. ratification.
The reasons JI may be politically essential for emission trading are the magnitude of the
prospective revenues for Russia and Ukraine, and the generally poor record in both countries
of putting to good use smaller transfers in the past. The very features of JI that make it
economically inefficient -- lots of transaction costs associated with defining baselines, cost
accounting, monitoring, and verification -- make it a promising vehicle for introducing the
sort of tighter controls and transparency that will be necessary for OECD countries to
consider transferring to Russia and Ukraine the kind of money estimated above. Assuming
that the OECD will insist on attaching strings to emission trading revenues of Russia and
Ukraine if full trading is to go forward, JI is an important opportunity for designing, testing,
and improving such strings. CDM has similar advantages, but, of more immediate
importance, it is the mechanism that most realistically promises to engage the developing
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 For a thorough discussion of the monitoring, verification, certification, reporting, and accounting issues
associated with emission trading, plus alternative designs for domestic systems and past experience, see
Tietenberg et al., 1998.
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countries, and thus may be a route to a sufficient level of “meaningful participation” of
developing countries for the U.S. to declare itself satisfied.
These are the short-term reasons that progress on JI and CDM is important. Their
longer-term importance is their contribution to technology transfer. Although the IIASA-
WEC scenarios do not assume that every future improvement in the cost or performance of
low- and non-carbon technologies is immediately diffused throughout the world, Scenario A3
is a high-growth market oriented scenario. Technological diffusion follows economic
incentives mediated by functioning markets. And the diffusion of low- and non-carbon
technologies around the world is essential for the eventual climate stabilization reached in
Scenario A3. In reality, or course, those markets function imperfectly. Energy markets in
most countries are skewed by uneven subsidies, charges, and regulations and by pricing and
payment practices that can garble price signals. Even relatively smoothly functioning markets
are poor at transferring simultaneously to distant locations a new technology along with its
supporting networks of installers, repairers, spare parts suppliers, fuel suppliers, trainers,
financiers, and others. JI and CDM can be used to overcome some, although hardly all, of
these difficulties and facilitate the type of technology diffusion necessary for a Scenario A3
strategy. To the extent possible, progress on JI and CDM should reinforce private interests in
gaining credit for inexpensive international carbon reductions. Firms should be, and already
are, interested in the most inexpensive reductions for which they can get credit, and the
advantages of expanding corporate JI and CDM initiatives are the same as the advantages of
encouraging their early initiatives in carbon reductions and emission trading. It increases
political support and helps lock us in, both socially and technologically, toward a lower
carbon future.
The G-77 and China have taken the position that the technology transfer called for in
the UNFCCC should not take place only through the market. That is not at odds with the
proposal here. To suggest that businesses be encouraged to aggressively expand CDM
projects in order to reap efficient emission reduction credits does not exclude expanding
additional technology transfer through the UN’s Global Environment Facility (GEF). A party
to the UNFCCC can certainly advocate making progress on both technology transfer fronts at
once. The idea is to mobilize private money through CDM projects as well as the principally
public money mobilized through the GEF.
Private business involvement in buying “certified emission reductions” (the phrase the
Kyoto Protocol reserves for CDM emission reductions) should also help shift the current
perspective on developing country reductions in a more promising direction. The immediate
reality is that, although the South is much more likely than the North to suffer from climate
change, southern interests dictate the investment of their available funds in development
rather than in climate change abatement. Whether this is explained by higher discount rates,
different priorities, higher or lower moral perspectives, or whatever, does not really matter.
The point is that the South, left to its own devices, is highly unlikely to invest in abating
climate change. If any investment is going to be made, it will have to come from the North.
The most persuasive reason that private firms or northern taxpayers could have for investing
in climate change abatement in the South is that the South offers the most cost-effective
abatement opportunities. Yes, there are many people, particularly in the South, who argue for
northern investment in southern climate change abatement for moral and ethical reasons
(Shukla, 1999; Torvanger and Godal, 1999). But cost-effectiveness has a much wider appeal.
However, northern investments in southern climate change abatement are cost-effective only
if they are not too risky, that is, if the South can deliver effective abatement with a high
enough reliability. It is thus in the interests of both North and South to assure that the South
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has a good product to sell -- reliable, predictable, cost-effective mitigation. CDM projects
with extensive participation by private firms who are obliged by their shareholders to give top
priority to the bottom line could reinforce this perspective on climate change abatement.
Seeing inexpensive climate change abatement as a new southern product to be developed and
marketed to northern firms and governments, may be less ethically satisfying to the South
than seeing the UNFCCC negotiations as a quest for justice. But it may be more lucrative and
better for southern development. A developing country pursuing such a strategy would focus
on improving quality (i.e., reliability), expanding production (i.e., opportunities for CDM
projects), and cutting transaction costs (i.e., cutting red tape and improving information).
Eventually, such a country may judge the less restricted option of emission trading as
sufficiently more lucrative than CDM to justify joining Annex I. It would presumably then
accept a modest mutually agreed limit on its own future GHG emissions in order to have a
free hand in the emission trading market. A like minded developed country would be
aggressively assisting its firms in finding partners, assuring quality, and lowering transaction
costs.
In the case of the Russian bubble, JI was presented above as an opportunity to
introduce confidence-building controls and transparency to energy investments and transfers
to Russia and Ukraine -- as a chance to design, test, and improve the sort of strings that the
OECD will likely want to attach to emission trading with Russia and Ukraine. But for full-
scale trading, OECD politicians will probably demand full-scale strings -- or ropes. Scaling
up the yet-to-be-established strings of JI and CDM to a strength commensurate with the scale
of the envisioned emission trading revenues (the range cited above was US$20 billion to
US$170 billion) will require more creativity than can be offered in this chapter. One
suggestion of the IIASA-WEC study, however, is worth repeating. It starts with the
recognition that FSU is situated between two major energy-consuming regions. To its West,
growth is slowing in Western Europe (WEU), but consumption will stabilize at high levels
and gas imports will rise. To the East are the fastest-growing markets of the future. By 2000,
or shortly thereafter, annual energy demand in the developing countries of Asia will reach
three gigatons oil equivalent (Gtoe), surpassing that of WEU, Eastern Europe (EEU), and
FSU combined. It would be very much in FSU’s interest, but also very expensive, to build a
network linking its oil and particularly its gas resources, both in central Asia and Siberia, to
the large markets to its East and West. If rules on emission trading to be adopted at COP-6
were to include a mechanism through which Russia and Ukraine could be required to invest
their revenues in such a network, three things might happen. First, it could accelerate
Eurasian progress on natural gas, the cleanest of the fossil fuels and a good transition fuel
toward non-fossil synthetics. This would help to partially lock in FSU and maybe a good part
of Asia to a cleaner long-term development path. Second it could leverage a short-term
Russian and Ukrainian windfall into a possible long-term revenue stream from energy sales.
And third it could make the prospect of a US$100 billion transfer to Russia and Ukraine more
politically palatable.
7 Summary
The important lessons from the scenario literature in general, and from the IIASA-
WEC scenarios in particular, are the importance of technological progress to reduce the
world’s energy intensity and the importance of shifting from fossil to non-fossil fuels as our
primary energy sources. Three (half) of the six IIASA-WEC scenarios manage to match the
UNFCCC’s objective of stabilizing the atmospheric GHG concentration by combining
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sufficient technological progress with a large enough shift toward non-fossil fuels. Of these,
Scenarios C1 and C2, which achieve the lowest GHG emissions and concentrations, assume
carbon taxes and large North-to-South transfers that appear politically unrealistic in the near-
term. More promising is Scenario A3 in which the energy supply shifts away from fossil fuels
because of economics driven not by carbon taxes but by cost-reducing investments.
A strategy based on Scenario A3 and taking into account the constraints of the current
UNFCCC negotiations should consider including the following.
• Support for unrestricted emission trading under the Kyoto Protocol. First, Scenario A3’s
carbon emissions as shown in Figure 5 and Figure 7 will require at least full emission
trading, and maybe a bit more (CDM perhaps?) to be brought into compliance with the
Kyoto commitments. Failure to comply with Kyoto’s limits would undercut the prospects
of any strategy. Second, against the standard of successfully motivating technological
progress, the arguments reviewed above in favor of unrestricted emission trading appear
stronger than the arguments in favor of trading caps. In particular, unrestricted emission
trading appears more likely to encourage “a thousand flowers to bloom,” to provide early
encouragement for the large essential tangible investments in niche markets needed to
supplement R&D, and to motivate early technological, business, and political
developments that will tilt technological lock-in toward a low-carbon future.
• Support for JI and CDM. JI and CDM provide mechanisms, first, to aid technology
transfer; second, to gain experience on a manageable scale with strings that might
eventually make large emission trading revenues for Russia and Ukraine politically
palatable; third, to engage developing countries to an extent the U.S. might judge
sufficiently “meaningful” to justify ratification; and, fourth, to encourage a southern
perspective on low-cost mitigation opportunities as commodities to be profitably
marketed rather than hostages to justice.
• Post-Kyoto agreements that combine northern willingness to pay with inexpensive
southern mitigation. Carbon emissions are growing fastest in developing countries and
must eventually be brought under control if the UNFCCC’s GHG stabilization objective
is to be realized. But the willingness to pay that exists to avoid climate change lies in the
developed countries. Neither the ambitions of the Byrd-Hagel resolution (developing
countries commit as early as 2008 to emission reductions) nor the ambitions of those
seeking large, lucrative, early entitlements for the South are likely to be realized. More
plausible is a scenario where good initial experience with northern investments in
southern mitigation opportunities leads to further investments. This would tie North-to-
South transfers to the emission reductions that the North is willing to pay for. It would be
consistent with fairness principles expecting the North to bear all initial mitigation costs
for a long time, it would allow northern firms to choose the investments that profit them
most, and it would take advantage of markets to motivate needed technological progress
and improve efficiency.
• Post-Kyoto agreements that encourage but do not demand too ambitious energy intensity
improvement rates. Figure 7 shows Scenario A3’s CO2 emissions increasing after 2010
with global reductions only occurring in the second half of the 21st century. This reflects
economic recovery in FSU and EEU and the time required for new technologies to
improve and diffuse widely (in a scenario with an aggregate energy intensity
improvement just slightly better than long-term historical experience, i.e., 1% per year).
Future protocols should consistently seek to accelerate energy intensity improvements,
but should not make success dependent on substantial, unprecedented changes in the
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long-term aggregate energy intensity improvement rate. This may require post-Kyoto
limits that allow emissions to rise initially before beginning their decline.
• Domestic initiatives reinforcing private incentives to invest in increasing energy
efficiency and shifting away from fossil fuels. These might include programs to reinforce
private participation in emission trading, JI, and CDM by recognizing early carbon
reductions, emission trades, and JI and CDM investments, by reducing transaction costs,
or by instituting directly a domestic trading program.
• Supportive government investments in RD&D and infrastructure. Money may not always
be able to quickly buy technological progress, but it can certainly make it easier.
Governments could usefully increase their RD&D funding targeted on improving
efficiency and the production and use of non-fossil energy. (As a fraction of GDP, federal
energy R&D in the U.S., for example, is now at its lowest point in 30 years; PCAST,
1997.) Governments also have important roles to play in the early expansion of
infrastructures needed if new technologies are to become widespread. Public funds, for
example, built most of the roads that have helped addict us to the internal combustion
engine. They have a role in building the new infrastructures to help wean us from such
addictions -- whether through expanding alternative fuel networks, creating markets for
intermittent renewable electricity, or facilitating carbon emission trading.
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